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The phrase ‘intuitionistic propositional calculus’ refers to the propositional
calculus (HPC) proposed by Heyting in 1930, obtained by deleting Excluded
Middle from classical propositional calculus. While it has been rather agreeably
argued that it is an adequate propositional calculus for constructive logic, it is also
well known that Brouwer’s considerations of choice sequences (Continuity Princi-
ples) lead into classically inconsistent consequences. In particular, it is possible to
show
(*) 1VP  (P VlP),
i.e. refute Excluded Middle [5]. The formula just exhibited contains a quantifier
over propositional variables, i.e., it is expressed in the second-order language. In
this paper, we will be considering other such formulas, implied by or consistent
with Continuity Principles.
Another motivation for this lies in the existence of many sheaf models for
intuitionistic analysis [3]. Quite general conditions on a topological space X are
known for Continuity Principles to hold in the topological interpretation on X.
Since the truth values of propositions are open sets of X, these conditions might
be alternatively expressed in second-order propositional calculus.
Higgs (cf. e.g. [4]) has proved that if 0 is the truth value object of a topos, then
every monomorphism f: L! + fl is an involution. Since 0 is roughly the ‘set of all
propositions’, one expects that this says something about propositional calculus.
In particular, it says that
vP,q wP++fs)++(P++s>)+vP @P++P). (1)
John Kearns of SUNY at Buffalo suggested that perhaps on some reasonable
interpretation of ‘intuitionistic connective’ the only (extensional) connective f
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which satisfies the antecedent of (1) is the identity, i.e., that
VP, 4 UP - fq> - (P++ 4)) + VP UP ++ P>, (2)
is intuitionistically at least worth considering. (Notice that classically the only f’s
satisfying the antecedent of (1) are negation and the identity, and that negation
does not satisfy it intuitionistically.)
We show that (2) is equivalent to a purely propositional formula
VP K(P++ s> * 4) -+ PI --, 4, (3)
and that it holds in Krol’s model for intuitionistic analysis [6], hence that it is
consistent with Va 3n-Continuity  Principle with parameters, Uniformity Princi-
ple, Bar Induction, Kripke’s Schema, and Dependent Choice (cf. below for the
precise statements of these principles). Notice that the formula (*), (with which
we started the discussion above) is equivalent to
1 VP (1lP --, PI, (4)
which is a special case of (3), for q = 1. It is equivalent to the following weakening
of (2):
~P,4(cfpf,fS)~(Pf,4)>-,~~~PcfP~P).
The formula
(5)
vP[Pv(P+q)l+q, (6)
suggested by 1 Vp (p vlp) and by some propositional operators considered in [3,
32,181, is intermediate between (3) and (4). Also, it distinguishes between parame-
terless and full Va! 3n-Continuity:  it follows from the second, but it is indepen-
dent of the first.
Myhill  [8] proved that if a constructive universe allows only the recursive
functions as functions f: N-+ N (Church’s Thesis), then 0 (as the power-set of a
singleton) has the property that there are no functions g: A + f2 from any A c N
which are surjective in the sense of having a section h: 0 -+ A (so that gh is the
identity on 0). We show that the parameterless VCY%-Continuity  Principle
implies that there are no surjective functions g : I3 -+ KJ from any B E NN.
Some of our results were obtained in 1978 jointly with J. Myhill,  while the
author was a graduate student at SUNY at Buffalo, and were announced in [9].
We would like to express gratitude to Professor Myhill  for his lively and inspiring
discussions, and for his kind suggestion that the paper be written in its present
form.
1. Second-order intuitionistic  propositional calculus
Let HPC+ be obtained from Heyting’s propositional calculus by adjoining
variables f, g, . . . for (one-place) propositional connectives, quantifiers
Vp, 3p, Vf,  3f for both kinds of variables (with the usual rules for these quan-
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tifiers), and the comprehension schema
3f. Vp (fp- (* . . p . . .)).
First we prove Higgs’ result (1) in HPC’.
Proposition 1.1. HPC’ proves (1).
Proof. We argue somewhat informally, following the general idea of Johnstone’s
proof in [4]. Assume the antecedent of (l), i.e. assume
VP, 4 HfP - fs) 3 (P * S)l> (7)
and the extensionality condition
VP, 4 HP * 4) -+ (fP - fdl, (8)
we shall deduce
ffP ++ P. (9)
(Here and henceforth we omit initial universal quantifiers unless the context is
ambiguous.) We proceed via three lemmas.
Lemma 1.1. fp -+ (fTt, p) (where T is a true proposition).
Proof. Assume fp and fT. Then fpo fr and by (7), p + T, i.e. p. So fp -+
(j’T --+ p). Conversely, assume fp and p. Then Ttt p, and by (B), fl* fp. But fp
was assumed true, so fl. Thus fp -+ (p + fl). Combining these, fp + (fr- p),
Lemma 1.2. f2p --+ p. (Here and henceforth f*p is &, and likewise for f3p, etc.)
Proof. Assume f’p. Then jT* fp by Lemma 1.1, so p- T by (7), and thus p.
Lemma 1.3. fp -+ f3p.
Proof. Assume fp. Then fp* T, and by (B), f’p- fl. But fre p by Lemma 1.1,
so f2p- p. By (8) again f3p*fp. But fp was assumed true, so f3p.
Now we can finish the proof of Proposition 1.1. By Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3,
fp- f3p. So by (7), ptf f’p, i.e. (9) holds, and we are done.
Proposition 1.2. (2) and (3) are equivalent (in HP(Y).
Proof. Assume (2) and the antecedent of (3); we shall prove q. In (2) let fp be
p-q. Then since the antecedent of (3) was assumed true, f2p- p and so
(p- q) ++ (fp* fq), hence by (2), fp* p. i.e. (p* q)+- p for all p. In particular,
(qeq)-q and q is true. This proves (2)-+ (3).
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Conversely, assume (3) and the antecedent of (2), i.e.
(10)
we shall prove
VP VP++ P). (11)
By (10) and Lemma 1.1, fp -+ (p-p),  and conversely (p+fT) + Cfp-~ffT)  +
cfp + T) (by Proposition 1.1) * fp. Hence Vp (fp - (p+ fl)). By Proposition 1.1
again, VP (f’ptf P), i.e. VP  (((P-F) *fr) f-, p), so by (3), f’I, w h e n c e
fp * (p++ fr> * p. This proves (3) -+ (2).
Proposition 1.3. (4) and (5) are equivalent (in HPC’).
Proof. To prove (4) --, (5), we first prove that (4) implies
vPr((P++d++d+Pl+1T (12)
Assume (4), the antecedent of (12), and q, i.e. qt, 1. Then by the antecedent of
(12), VP [((P t, J-) * I) + p], which together with (4) gives 1. Hence llq. Now
assume the antecedent of (5). Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 1.2, with
the use of (12) instead of (3), we get llfr instead of fr. Following that proof
further and using the valid formula (r + s) + (l-~r+lls),  we finally get
1-1 Vp (fp- p), which proves (4) + (5).
For the converse, observe that (5) is classically false and that (5) is in fact
provable in the (classical) system obtained by adjoing Vp (11~  -+ p) to HPC’. By
the deduction theorem HPC’ t Vp (11~ + p) ---, l(5), whence HPC’ I- (5) --, (4).
The next two propositions give an intermediate formula between (2) and (5),
and alternate characterizations of (5).
Proposition 1.4. Each of the following propositional formulas implies the next (in
HPC’) :
VP[((P++d++d-+Pl-+% (3)
vP[Pv(P-+dl~q~ (6)
vPcPv(P++dl--,q. (13)
Proof. (6) + (13) is obvious. To show (3) + (6), assume the antecedent of (6). We
will show the antecedent of (3). If p is true, we are done. If p + q, let (p* q) f, q.
Thus (q + p) f-, q. Since q A (q + p) -+ p is valid, we have q A q + p, i.e. q + p.
Thus q, and hence p.
We shall show in the next section that (6) is strictly stronger than (13).
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Proposition 1.5. The folllowing  formz4Zas are equivalent (in HPC’):
vP[Pv(P++q)l+q,
lVP[PV(P++dl,
1 VP (P v lP>>
(13)
(14)
(*>
1 VP (1lP * P>. (4)
Proof. (*) * (4) is obvious, since Vp (p v-rp) * Vp (11~ + p). (*) is a special
case of (14) for q = 1. (14) obviously implies (13). To show (13) -+ (14), observe
that
VP h-Jv(P++q)l+~q (15)
is valid. Indeed, the antecedent of (15) gives in particular (for p = _L) I f-, q,i.e.,
lq. Finally, to show (*) + (14) it suffices (by 15) to show Vp [p v(pt* q)] +
1 lq. So, assume (*>, Vp [p v (p- q)], and lq. For any p, p * q gives pf* I,
since q* 1. Thus Vp [p v (p* q)] gives Vp [p vlp],  contradicting (*). Thus
-114, as required.
2. Consistency and independence of second-order propositional formulas
We first show that (*) is strictly weaker than (6). We use topological interpreta-
tion of intuitionistic logic (cf. e.g. [3]).
Lemma 2.1. Let X be a T1 space. Then (6) fails over X, whereas (*) holds over X
ifi X has no isolated points.
Proof. Let q = X\(x).  We show that the antecedent of (6), Vp [p v(p + q)] holds
over X, thus showing that (6) fails over X.
Case 1: xEp. Then p+q=int((X\p)Uq)=q,  since x~p gives X\pc
X\{x}=q.  So, pv(p-+q)=pvq=pUq=X,  since xEp.
Case 2: x# p. Then
p + q = W(X\ PI U 4) = M(X\ p> U (X\{xH) = X,
since xE(X\p).  So, pv(p+q)=pUX=X.
As for (*), suppose XEX is an isolated point, i.e. {x} is clopen(X is Tl). If
p E X is an open set, then x&p gives x E (X\p>, so x E lp = int(X\p). Thus
xEVp(pvip)=intn{pUlp(pEXopen},
and so -I Vp (p vlp) G X\(x).
If, on the other hand, X has no isolated points, then for any x EX and
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P = X\{x), P VlP = PUint(X\p)=pUp)=p,  so
Vp(pvlp)rn{x\{x}IxEx}=pJ.
Thus 1 Vp (p vlp) = X, i.e. it holds over X.
Corollary 2.1. (*) is strictly weaker than (6).
On the other hand, we shall soon show (6) is still a consequence of the full
Va 3n-Continuity  Principle:
VcJn.A(a, n) + VcGlk, m.Vy[E(k)  = r(k) --, A(r, WI)],
where (Y, y range over Baire space NN (choice sequences), c(k)  denotes the initial
segment of (Y of length k, and parameters are allowed in A. The consistency of
this non-classical principle with intuitionistic higher-order arithmetic (HAH) was
shown only recently by Krol [6]. The consistency of the parameterless case was
known for some time [7], (cf. also [l]),  by the topological interpretation over
Baire space. In fact, the full Va 3n-Continuity  Principle fails over Baire space [l]
(and by Lemma 2.1, so does (6)). To summarize:
Theorem 2.1. 7’he  second-order propositional formula
vPrPv(P-+q)l+a (6)
follows from the full Va 3n-Continuity,  but it does not follow from the parameter-
less Va 3n-Continuity.
Proof. It remains to show the first part. Suppose (6), then in particular
va [Vx.cYx = 0 v (Vx.ax  = 0 + q)].
Thus
Vcz.3  [(n =OAVx.ax =O)v(n = lr\(Vx.ax =O+q))],
and the full Va: 3n-Continuity  (with q as a parameter) gives
Vo.3km.Vr  [(Y(k) = r(k)
+[(m  =OAVx.yx  =O)v(m = lr\(Vx.yx  =O+q))]].
Take any (Y, and find k, m as specified in (17). If m = 0, then
(16)
(17)
Vy [S(k)  = y(k) -+ Vx.yx = 01,
absurd. Thus (16) gives Va (Vx.ax  = 0 + q). Choose a! to be the constant zero
sequence. Hence q.
Remark. The above proof is in HAH. Kripke’s Schema (cf. below) can be used to
replace q by a choice sequence as a parameter.
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We do not know whether (3) is strictly stronger than (6) (cf. Proposition 1.4).
We also do not know whether it follows from the full t/a! 3n-Continuity.
However:
Theorem 2.2. The second-order propositional formula
VP [((P++ 4) * s) * PI + 47 (3)
holds in Krol’s  model [6] for intuitionistic analysis, and is thus consistent with
HAH together with all of the following principles [6], [lo]:
(i) Full Va 3n-Continuity,
(ii) Kripke’s Schema : Vp 3a (3n.cxn  # 0 * p),
(iii) Uniformity Principle: VXc_iV.3n.A(X,  n)-+!ln.VXrN.A(X,  n).
(iv) Bar-Induction (BI): The assumptions (with u ranging over finite sequences
of natural numbers):
Vu (R(u) + Vn.R(u * (n))), Vu (R(u)  + Q(u)),
Va.Zln.R(E(n)) and Vu ((Vn Q(u * (n))) * Q(u)),
imply  Q(( >).
(v) Relativized  Dependent Choice (RDC) (for any type X);
VXEX(A(X)+~~EX(A(~)AB(X.  y))))*
-+VXEX(A(X)-,~~EX~  (f(O)=xr\Vn  (A(f(n))~B(f(n),f(n+l))))).
corollary 2.2.
VP>q  (UP +-+  fs> ++ (P ++ 4)) + VP CfP ++ P)
is consistent with (i)-(v) as well.
(2)
proof. See Proposition 1.2 (HPC’ is a subsystem of HAH).
Before we give the proof of Theorem 2.2, let us recall some features of Krol’s
model [6]. The truth values are interpreted as open sets of Cantor space 2N, fixed
by certain homeomorphisms. In particular, we say that a sequence f: N + N is
rare if f(n) # f(m) for m # n, and lim, n/f(n) = 0. Given two rare sequences f, g,
let h be a rare sequence obtained from the sequence f(O), g(O), f(l),
g(l),  . . . , f(n), g(n), . . . by omitting all numbers which already appeared. We
write h = f * g. We say that an automorphism 4: 2N + 2N is an f-automorphism
(where f: N + N is rare) if (4x)cfn)  = x&z)  for all x E 2N, n EN.  The truth values
of propositions are then given by f-admissible open sets Vc 2N, i.e. such that
4V = V for every f-automorphism 4 E G, for a certain subgroup of automorph-
isms of 2N, where f ranges over all rare sequences. By a technical lemma, one
then interprets quantifiers Vp A, 3pA (where A is a propositional formula all of
whose parameters are f-admissible open sets for a given rare sequence f) over
f * g-admissible open sets, with g being any given rare sequence whose range is
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disjoint from the range of f Note that every f * g-automorphism is an f-
automorphism, so every f-admissible set is f * g-admissible.
Let us look at some special f-admissible sets for a given rare f. Given x E 2N, let
Ff, = {y E 2N  ( y(fn) = x(fi), for all n} = n {y E 2N ( y(fn) = x(fn)}.
n
It is closed, as an intersection of clopens. Let Ufi = 2N\Fc.  Both Ff,, and U{ are
fixed by any f-automorphism. We claim that int(Ff,)  = 8. Indeed, let s E 6’ g Ff,, for
an open set 0’. Then for some m, each t E 2N such that t(m) = s(m) must be in 0.
But take II large enough so that f(n) > m and let t be such that t&z) # x&z).  Then
t E 0, but tg Ff,, a contradiction. So int(Ff,)  = $4.
proof  of Theorem 2.2. First, let q = Uf, for some x E 2N, and rare f. Let g be a
rare sequence such that range(g) fl range(f) = (a. Look at
Ff”={y ~2~ ) y((f  * g>n)=x((f  * g)n), for all n}~Fi.
Ff, is in fact an uncountable disjoint union of FYI’s for certain y E Ff;: one
considers all possibilities of y(gn)  at each 11 EN, for y EF~,. Let p = Ufy*g=
2N \ Ffy*g, for such y. Clearly, q c p. Then
(p* q) = (p ---,  q) = int((2N  \ p) U q) = int(Ff,*”  U q) = q.
Indeed, suppose the contrary, so that s E 0, for some s E Ffyg, and for an open set
0 c Ff”U q. Thus for some m, each t E 2N such that 5(m) = f(m)  must be in 0.
But let II be large enough so that g(n)> m, and let t be such that t EF~;= 2N\q,
and t(gn) # y(gn). Thus t& Ffg, but t E 0, a contradiction. Thus indeed (p++  q) =
q. Hence ((p tf q) ++ q) = (q f-, q) = 2N,  and hence (((p e q) H q) -+ p) = p. Now
VP [((P ++ 4) ++ q) + PI E int n {(N2N \ Ff,*‘) f-, 4) - 4)
veFf
-+ (2N \ Ff*“)} = (by the above)Y
= int ,?,
f
(2N\Ff;Lg)  = int(2N\ ,g
x
F{*‘)
= int(2N  \ Ff,) = int Uf, = Uf, = q.
Thus in this instance, (3) holds.
If q is an arbitrary f-admissible open set, then for F = 2N \q we have
F= u Ff,= u u Ffrg,
XEF xeFysF:
so in the above argument, let x vary over F, i.e. work with F instead of Ff. Thus
(3) holds for any q.
Remark. Krol’s model was embedded in a symmetric extension of intuitionistic
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ZF in [lo].  By those techniques, Theorem 2.2 automatically extends to a
consistency result w.r.t. set theory.
3. Maps to a
(1) implies that 0 is Dedekind finite. On the other hand, we now show that
Va! 3n-Continuity  Principle implies that the cardinality of R is incomparable with
the cardinality of NN. We use a consequence of Va !In-Continuity,  BI, and RDC,
called Strong Vcu 3!p-Continuity  [2,§3.3],  (cf. its precise statement below).
Proposition 3.1. Strong Va 3!0-Continuity implies that there is no map 4: A + 0
with a section, for any A E NN.
Proof. Strong Va 3!p-Continuity  states that every function Qi: NN + NN is de-
termined by a function h : N + N such that for any f: N + N, and any n E N there
exists m E N such that (@f>(n) = h((n, f(O), . . . , f(m))), in which case we say that
@ is djh (cf. [5]).
Let A c N”, and suppose +:A + 0 and $:a + A are such that (&j(p) = p
for all p E 0. Say B EN”.  For any f: N -+ N consider the set Dr = {x E (0) ( f E B} E
0. We have
x~+//Dr*x=Or\fEB.
Let A,=CfgA) &f={O}}, and define x(f) = 4(D). Then
x(f)EAof,~xf={O}t,OE~~~~C,fEB.
We have done this for any B E NN, so in particular let B, =
cf: N + N) @~(f>q!A,}. There exists ,yO:  N” + NN such that always f~
BO* xo(f)EAO. By Strong Va 3!/3-Continuity,  x0 is Qh for some h: N + N. But
now
hEB,tt~h(h)~Aooxo(h)~Aooh~Bo,
a contradiction.
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